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What You Don't Know Could Save
Your Life: A Case for Federal
Insurance Disclosure Legislation
I.

Introduction

Imagine that you have just been diagnosed with advanced
prostatic cancer. Although this type of cancer responds well to
treatment if it is detected early, in its later stages the disease is
incurable, Now imagine learning that your life insurance company
discovered the cancer thirteen months ago when it received the
results of a blood test administered as part of your policy application. The insurance company never informed you of your test
results and, under current law, it was not required to do so.
Finally, imagine the difference thirteen months might have made
in your struggle with the cancer. Remember, the disease can be
highly curable in its initial stages.
For many Americans, an insurance company's failure to
disclose potentially life saving information is not a hypothetical
situation. It is, instead, a horrific reality. Take, for example, the
recent case of Deramus v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co.' in
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ruled that a life insurance company had no obligation to disclose to
an applicant that he had tested positive for the AIDS virus.' In
April 1988, Frank Deramus applied for a monetary increase in his
life insurance policy with Jackson National Life Insurance Company ("JNL").3 Deramus, in compliance with JNL's application
requirements, underwent a medical examination which included a
blood and urine test.4 The results of the blood test revealed that

1. 92 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996), aff'g Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488
(S.D. Miss. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1996) (No. 96-947).
2. See id. at 282.

3. See Brief on Behalf of Appellant Jane Doe at 3, Deramus (No. 95-60675).
4. See Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488, 490 (S.D. Miss. 1995). "As

part of its application process, JNL required its applicants to submit to medical examinations . . . JNL reserved the right to refuse coverage if an applicant failed the medical
examination." Id.
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However, JNL never informed
Deramus was HIV positive.'
he
was infected with the highlyDeramus or his physician that
6
contagious and fatal AIDS virus. For the next eighteen-months,
an unsuspecting Frank Deramus received no treatment, engaged in
unprotected sexual intercourse with his wife, and followed no safety
precautions during his interactions with other people.7
Despite the overwhelming health risk nondisclosure presented
to Deramus and those with whom he was in contact, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi held
that "under Mississippi law an insurer has no duty to inform an
insurance applicant of the results of a medical examination where
the insurer administers the examination only to determine the
insurability of the applicant." 8 According to the court, "JNL
undertook simply to determine for itself whether it would accept
the risk of providing insurance coverage" to Frank Deramus.9
Although the outcome in Deramus may be troubling, the fact
that twenty-one other states would have reached the same result is
even more disturbing."0 Only twenty-nine states have enacted
laws which require insurance companies to disclose the results of
application medical tests." The remaining states and the federal
government do not currently mandate insurance company disclo-

5. See Brief for Appellee at 7, Deramus (No. 95-60675).
6. See id. JNL officials stated that they did not notify Frank Deramus that he had
tested HIV positive because their sole purpose for performing the medical exam was to
determine the risk associated with his application for life insurance. See id. at 13.
7. See Telephone Interview with Jody Deramus, Wife of Frank Deramus (Nov. 15,
1996). Unaware of his condition, Frank Deramus did not take advantage of available
medical treatment which could have eased his pain, prolonged his life, and enhanced his
quality of life. See id. In addition, Frank and Jody Deramus repeatedly tried to conceive
a child during this 18 month period, placing both Jody Deramus and the potential baby at
risk for contracting HIV. See id.
8. Deramus, 944 F. Supp. at 489.
9. id. at 492.
10. See Frederick Schmitt, Jackson Nat'l Fights Suit on Disclosing Test Results, NAT'L
UNDERWRYI'ER, Aug. 1996, at 3.
11. See id. The twenty-nine states which currently require insurance company disclosure
are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id. Since her husband's death, Jody
Deramus has been lobbying to convince the twenty-one states which do not require
disclosure to enact mandatory disclosure legislation. Deramus has said that "it is her mission
to educate and to try to change the law." Telephone Interview with Jody Deramus, Wife of
Frank Deramus (Apr. 8, 1997).
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sure. 12 Congress, however, is now considering insurance disclosure
legislation which would regulate the insurance companies' treatment of potentially lifesaving health information."3 The most far
reaching proposal is the Medical Privacy in the Age of New
Technologies Act,"a a federal disclosure bill which would apply to
all insurance companies. 5 Not only does the Act require that
insurance companies disclose the results of mandatory examinations
to policyholders and applicants, it also prevents the companies from
disclosing this information to other people and entities without
proper consent. 6 It is the position of this comment that such
insurance disclosure legislation must be adopted for the protection
of Americans and their access to critical health information.
Part II of this comment provides background information
about the insurance industry and the practice of underwriting. Part
III presents the facts and holdings of Deramus and other similar
nondisclosure cases. Part IV discusses the numerous health risks
associated with a policy of nonmandatory disclosure and asserts
that such risks are too detrimental to allow the current system to

12. See Schmitt, supra note 10, at 3. See also Life Insurer Has No Duty to Disclose to
Applicant Results of Medical Exam, HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) No. 5, at D-5 (Aug. 22, 1996)
[hereinafter Life Insurer Has No Duty],
13. Congress has the ability and power to enact such insurance disclosure legislation.
In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994)). Under this Act, Congress reserved its right to
enact specific insurance disclosure legislation while it transferred its general power to
regulate the insurance industry to the states. The Act, in pertinent part, states: "No Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon
such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance .... " 15
U.S.C.S. § 1012(b) (Law. Co-op. 1984). "[S]tatutes aimed at protecting or regulating
relationship between insurance company and policyholder, directly or indirectly are laws
regulating 'business of insurance."' Id.
14. H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. (1997).
15. See H.R. 1815. Currently, Congress is also considering the HIV Prevention Act of
1997. HR. 1062, 105th Cong. (1997). The purposes of the HIV Prevention Act are to
protect those individuals who are not infected with the HIV virus and to "help those who
are infected discover their status as early as possible." The HIV Prevention Act of 1997,
INFORMATION PACKET PROVIDED BY CONGRESSMAN TOM A. COBURN, M.D., 1997, at 2
(explaining the purpose and provisions of the Act). The HIV Prevention Act mandates the
disclosure of HIV test results if the test was required by the insurance company as a
condition of application. See H.R. 1062, § 6. Although this comment will focus on the
broader Medical Privacy in the Age of New Technologies Act because it requires disclosure
of more than HIV related information, all discussions pertaining to federal insurance
disclosure legislation necessarily include the HIV Prevention Act.
16. See Rep. McDermott Introduces Measures to Protect Health Information Privacy,
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) No. 5, at D-17 (May 23, 1996).
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remain intact. Part V presents legal arguments for congressional
enactment of federal disclosure legislation. It applies a risk-utility
analysis and argues that the resulting benefits of a mandatory
disclosure system greatly outweigh the costs imposed on the
insurance companies. This part also argues that there is no
significant distinction between professionals who are required to
disclose important information to concerned individuals and
insurance companies such that would justify holding insurance
companies to a lower standard of care. Through caselaw, this part
demonstrates that the same concerns and risks are at issue when
employers and doctors are required to disclose but insurers are not.
Part VI analyzes the Medical Privacy in the Age of New Technologies Act by discussing the two prongs of the Act, applicant
accessibility to health information and limited disclosure to third
parties. The comment concludes with a discussion of how insurance disclosure legislation should be enacted as a means of saving
lives and protecting individuals' privacy and confidentiality.
II. The Insurance Industry and Its Use of the Underwriting
Process
In an effort to gain a sense of security and to provide for loved
ones, individuals regularly purchase life insurance policies."1
Acquiring life insurance, however, involves a great deal more than
sending in a signed check. The unique nature of the life insurance
industry precludes the usual seller/consumer relationship. A system
in which an anonymous buyer purchases services or goods simply
will not work because life insurance is an information driven
business. Companies need to know who is purchasing their
insurance and what risks individual applicants bring to the general
pool of policy holders. As a result, applicants must reveal highly
personal information to the insurance companies. 8
Theoretically, "insurance is an arrangement for transferring
and distributing risk."' 9 It is based on the principle that policyholders with the same expected risk of loss should be treated

17. According to the American Council of Life Insurance ("ACLI"), the main reason
people buy life insurance "is to provide financial protection for their families if they
themselves should die prematurely." AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., LIFE INS. FACr BOOK 8

(1996) [hereinafter FACT BOOK].
18. See id. at 117.
19. ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 1.2, at 2 (1971). In fact, insurance was
founded on the concept of risk, See id. at 4.
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This founding principle allows the insurer to first
equally.2
determine the many differences that exist among individuals and,
then, to classify these differences and their corresponding potential
risks. 1 Insurance companies classify risks through underwriting
which is generally defined as the "process by which a life insurance
company determines whether or not it can accept an application for
life insurance, and if so, on what basis." 2 The process is an
attempt to predict future mortality and related morbidity costs so
that insurers can make sound coverage decisions by identifying and
evaluating potential losses.23 Because of the long-term, noncancelable nature of the life insurance contract, insurance companies
consider the underwriting of an applicant to be an essential and
critical procedure.2 4
Insurers underwrite on the basis of relevant health information
that they obtain through applications, medical records, and

diagnostic testing.25 Coverage eligibility depends on information
provided by both the applicant and her personal physician as well
as on the results of mandatory medical tests.26 The applicant must

answer questions about her personal and familial physical and
mental health histories.2

She must also answer questions con-

20. See Karen A. Clifford & Russell P. luculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale
for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1806, 1808 (1987).
21. See Herman T. Bailey et al., The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance
Classification,25 DRAKE L. REV. 779,780 (1976). The ability to classify insurance applicants
and policyholders helps protect insurance companies from adverse selection. Adverse
selection has been defined as the "tendency of persons who are poorer risks to seek
insurance to a greater extent than do persons who are better risks." Roberta B. Meyer,
International Symposium on Law and Science at the Crossroads: Biomedical Technology,
Ethics, Public Policy, and the Law: Justificationfor Permitting Life Insurers to Continue to
Underwrite on the Basis of Genetic Information and Genetic Test Results, 27 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1271, 1289 (1993) (citing JANICE E. GREIDER ET AL., LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE
CONTRACT 400 (5th ed, 1984)). Without classification as a safety mechanism, insurance
companies would become insolvent as the majority of their life insurance policies would go
to unhealthy individuals at the standard cost. See id.
22. FACT BOOK, supra note 17, at 145. The underwriting process results in persons with
substantially the same risks paying the same premiums. See id. at 119.
23. See Clifford & luculano, supra note 20, at 1808.
24. See WILLIAM F. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAW § 5:11, at 120 (1972),
25. See LEE R. RUSS, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1, at 1-57 (3d ed. 1995).
26. See JOSEPH MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 250-56 (1962).
27. See id. For instance, Frank Deramus was required to provide "extensive personal
information about such matters as [his] financial situation, family medical history,
employment, criminal record, traffic violations, hobbies, travel plans, certain habits, and [his]
spouse's insurance coverage." Plaintiff's Itemization of Facts in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 17, Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.
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cerning drug and alcohol use." In addition to these inquiries,
insurance companies commonly require urinalysis as a means of
screening for drug abuse and the presence of nicotine." Other
tests used in the underwriting process include general physical
For
examinations as well as more specialized procedures.3"
example, electrocardiograms are used to assess heart function. 1
Blood profiles are used to assess proper functioning of the liver and
kidneys, as well as to reveal any possibility of diabetes, serum
cholesteroi, heart risk factors, and AIDS. 32 Blood tests are also
used to detect cancer.33
As technology and biomedical science continue to advance and
to provide new insight into diseases and health conditions, the tests
used in the underwriting process have been correspondingly
updated as insurers try to further minimize their risks.3 4 Most

recently, insurance companies have begun to use genetic testing in
their underwriting process. 35 Through genetic tests, insurers can
determine "whether a person is predisposed to a particular
disease ... or whether a person has a genetic disease."36 The
evolution of such highly revealing tests has focused controversy on
many aspects of the underwriting process.37 Specifically, critics are

Miss. 1995) (No. J92-0225 (W)(C)) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Itemization of Facts].
28. See Maclean, supra note 26, at 252.
29. See id.
30. Currently, there is no government agency which approves the medical examinations
that insurance companies conduct. See Alfred G. Haggerty, Brouhaha Over Transarnerica
Cancer Blood Test, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Mar. 1993, at 16.
31. See Robert Goldstone, How to Sell Clients on Underwriting, NAT'L UNDERWRITER,

Sept. 1991, at 7, 8.
32. See id. at 8.
33. See Haggerty, supra note 30, at 16. The Tumor Associated Antigen test indicates
whether or not a particular insurance applicant has cancer. In the event the test
demonstrates a likelihood of cancer, more specific tests such as the Prostatic Specific Antigen
are conducted. See id.

34. See Mason King, Genetic Tests Spark Insurance Backlash; Results Shouldn't Be Used
Oct. 21, 1996, at 17.
to Set Rates, Critics Say, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J.,
35. See Sheryl Stolberg, Insurance Falls Prey to Genetic Bias; The DNA Revolution Is
a Blessing and a Curse., L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, at Al. During the past five years,
"researchers have identified more than 5,000 genes linked to specific disorders and have
developed more than 50 new genetic tests." Id. See also Shannon Brownlee & Joanne
Silberner, The Age of Genes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 4, 1991, at 64 (explaining the
discovery and use of genes as well as the process of genetic testing).
36. Julie Sneider, Insurance:Seeing What Develops, Bus. J.MILWAUKEE, Jan. 28, 1991,
at 12. See generally Shannon Brownlee et al., Tinkering with Destiny, U.S, NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 22, 1994, at 58 (listing and discussing current DNA disease tests).
37. See Meyer, supra note 21, at 1272.
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concerned with how insurance companies handle the private
medical information they obtain," how insurance companies treat
individual applicants,39 and how insurance companies utilize
certain tests in the underwriting process."
Privacy advocates, ethicists, and many citizens argue that the
underwriting process needs to be regulated because, under current
practice, insurance companies can lawfully demand and gain access
to one's most personal information.41 These critics fear that
without government intervention, the insurance industry's use of
sensitive personal information will result in discrimination and
invasions of privacy-if not in the elimination of privacy altogether.42 Not only are the test results used to deny coverage,
which in effect discriminates against carriers of certain illnesses and
genes, but they are also being shared with other insurance
companies without the applicant's consent.43 Through the Medical
Information Bureau ("MIB"), the largest United States insurance
reporting agency, applicants' personal information is readily

38. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
39. See Stolberg, supra note 35, at Al. Experts, including Dr. Jonathon Beckwith, a
Harvard University geneticist who advises the Human Genome Project on ethical issues,
believe that insurance companies are treating their applicants unfairly by using genetic test
results or familial medical history, both of which are imprecise indicators of risk, to deny
coverage or increase the coverage rate. See id.
40. See King, supra note 34, at 17. The insurance industry, in response to objections
concerning its use of genetic information in the underwriting process, insists that it has the
right to use this information to accurately assess an individual's risks. See id. See also Steven
Brostoff, CEOs: Defend Genetic Test Use in Underwriting,NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Apr. 1992,
at 24. On the other hand, consumer groups and privacy advocates view the use of these tests
as invasions of privacy and means of discrimination. See King, supra note 34, at 17. By
1996, more than a dozen states were considering bills which limited or prohibited the use of
genetic tests by insurance companies. See id. For an in-depth discussion of legislation
involving genetic testing and the insurance industry, see Heather McClure, The Insurance
Industry's Use of Genetic Information: Legal and Ethical Concerns, 28 J.HEALTH & HosP.
L. 231, 233 (1995). But see Meyer, supra note 21 (defending life insurers' use of genetic test
results in the underwriting process).
41. See David Brown, Individual 'Genetic Privacy' Seen as Threatened; Officials Say
Explosion of Scientific Knowledge Could Lead to Misuse of Information, WASH. POST, Oct.
20, 1991, at A6. See also Clifford & luculano, supra note 20, at 1816-18; Carol Lee, Creating
a Genetic Underclass: The Potential for Genetic Discrimination by the Health Insurance
Industry, 13 PACE L. REV. 189 (1993).
42. See Brown, supra note 41, at A6; Clifford & luculano, supra note 20, at 1816-18;
Lee, supra note 41, at 189.
43. See Laurel Shackelford, Insurers:How Much Should they Tell Insured?,COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 8, 1996, at 1D.
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accessible to life insurance companies nationwide.44 The MIB
gathers information about insurance applicants and furnishes it to
all MIB members for use in their underwriting process." Essentially, this system can result in an applicant's personal information
being dispersed throughout the entire insurance industry.46
I1. Nondisclosure Cases and the Courts
One of the primary purposes of the proposed Medical Privacy
in the Age of New Technologies Act is to give individuals "control
over their medical records., 47 The Act imposes an absolute duty
on insurance companies to disclose to applicants the results of their
medical examinations. It provides that individuals must have
"access to health information of which they are the subject."48
Congressional enactment of this legislation is necessary to ensure
health information accessibility because the courts have failed to
find a common law basis for such protection.
In the courts, the plaintiffs of these nondisclosure cases have
not prevailed. Although the courts have sympathized with the
plaintiffs and their families, they have repeatedly found for the
defendant insurance companies. In doing so, they have proceeded
on a basic negligence analysis and have relied on the common law

44. See Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Exchange Among Insurers of Medical Information
Concerning Insured or Applicant for Insurance as Invasion of Privacy, 98 A.L.R.3d 561

(1995).

The MIB is an unincorporated, nonprofit trade association which has medical

information on close to 15 million American and Canadian citizens on file. See id. See also
Maureen Minehan, The Right to Medical Privacy; Increasing Employee Concerns, HUM.
RFSOURCF MAG., Mar. 1997, at 160. Currently, MI3's 750 member companies "account for

99 percent of all individual life insurance policies" issued in the United States. See Largest
InsuranceReporting Agency Agrees to Give Consumers Information, HEALTH L. REP. (BNA)
No. 3, D-37 (July 3, 1995) [hereinafter Largest Insurance Reporting Agency]; Minehan, supra

at 160.
45. See Largest Insurance Reporting Agency, supra note 44, at D-37. Data collected and
supplied by the MIB may include such facts as an individual's medical conditions, "credit
history, driving records, criminal activity, and participation in hazardous sports." Id. The
MIB's databank also includes domestic violence information. For example, "an insurer told

a woman [applicant] that she was being denied life insurance based on information received
from the Medical Information Bureau, which disclosed that she had been abused." Terry
L. Fromson & Nancy Durborow, Abuse Victims Do Need Confidentiality Protection, NAT'L
UNDERWRrrER, Feb, 1997, at 25.
46. For more information on the MIB (and to find out if they have a file on you!)
contact the MIB at 160 University Avenue, Westwood, Massachusetts 02090; (617) 329-4500.
47. McDermott Introduces Legislation Raising Medical Privacy Standards: Ensures
Privacy Rights Keep Pace with New Technologies, NEWS FROM CONGRESSMAN JIM

MCIDERMOTT, May 16, 1996 (Press Release, Washington, D.C.).
48. H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (1997).
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in holding that there is no strict duty owed by insurance companies
to their applicants. The courts have also pointed to problems of
causation and contributory negligence as additional issues precluding recovery.
As discussed above, after applying for additional life insurance
coverage, Frank Deramus submitted to blood tests in accordance
with JNL's underwriting policies.49 Although the test results
revealed that Deramus was HIV positive, the insurance company
did not communicate this information to Deramus.50 Instead, due
to a processing error, JNL sent Deramus a rejection letter stating
that "his application had been rejected 'because delivery of the
policy was not accepted."' 5 However, even upon discovering this
notification error, JNL did not inform Deramus of his HIV positive
status.5 2 Rather, JNL's agent, who had been working with
Deramus, told him that his application had been rejected due to a
medical condition. 3 JNL did, however,54 officially notify the MIB
of Deramus's HIV positive test results.
Thereafter, on May 23, 1988, Deramus wrote to JNL's
underwriting department and requested that all information
regarding his medical condition, including the results of his blood
On July 5, 1988, after
test, be forwarded to his physician.
receiving no response to his May letter, Frank Deramus wrote JNL
another letter.56 In his second letter, Deramus not only requested
that information regarding his medical condition be sent to his
physician, but he also informed the company that he "was recently
hospitalized, and [his] physicians were unable to provide a basic

49. See Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488, 490 (S.D. Miss. 1995). The

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a one sentence opinion, affirmed and adopted the
trial court's decision in its entirety. See Deramus v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 274
(5th Cir. 1996). Therefore, all references to the Deramus case will be cited to the lower
court's opinion.
50. See Deramus, 944 F. Supp. at 490.
51. Id.

52. See Plaintiff's Itemization of Facts, supra note 27, at 20.
53. See Deramus, 944 F. Supp. at 490.
54. See Plaintiff's Itemization of Facts, supra note 27, at 22. JNL's disclosure to the

MIB of Deramus' HIV status was done in coded form. See id.
55. See id. at 23. JNL denied ever receiving a letter from Deramus requesting
information concerniing his medical condition. JNL, however, believed that the existence of
such a letter was immaterial to the outcome of the case and, therefore, did not challenge this
assertion. See Brief for Appellee at 10, Deramus v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 274
(5th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-60675).
56. See Plaintiff's Itemization of Facts, supra note 27, at 23.
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reason for [his] illness., 57 He wrote: "I feel that it is very important that I know the results of my tests since those results might be
helpful in correctly diagnosing my condition and gettin, appropriate treatment." 58 Deramus' request was not honored tor, as JNL
stated in its appellate brief, "there was absolutely no undertaking
59
to protect Mr. or Mrs. [Deramus] from any health care risk.,
On October 27, 1989, eighteen months after JNL discovered
his HIV condition, Frank Deramus learned that he was HIV
He had been hospitalized at The Johns-Hopkins
positive.'
Medical Center and, while there, his physicians diagnosed him with
the AIDS virus. 61 On June 19, 1991, nine days before Frank
Deramus's death, JNL sent his physician the requested medical
information including the positive results of his 1988 HIV test.62
Following the receipt of this information and her husband's
death, Jody Deramus filed suit against JNL claiming that JNL
breached its duty to disclose to the Deramuses or to their designated physician the results of Frank Deramus' application blood
tests. 63 The court, however, found no merit in Deramus' claim
and entered summary judgment for JNL. The court held that
"under Mississippi law an insurer has no duty to inform an
insurance applicant of the results of a medical examination where
the insurer administers the examination only to determine the
insurability of the applicant."'
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the multiple
legal theories which Deramus offered as the basis for the duty JNL
owed to Frank and Jody Deramus. First, Deramus asserted that
JNL had a duty of disclosure because of the confidential relationship that existed between her husband and JNL: a relationship that
was created by JNL's access to and control of Deramus's confidential medical information.65 The court, however, disagreed, finding
that a confidential relationship did not exist between them, The
court explained that in order for a confidential relationship to exist
and, more importantly, for the law to recognize a duty arising out
57.

id.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 23-24.
Brief for Appellee at 41, Deramus (No. 95-60675).
See Plaintiff's Itemization of Facts, supra note 27, at 26.
See Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488, 491 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
See id. at 491; Plaintiff's Itemization of Facts, supra note 27, at 28.
See Deramus, 944 F. Supp. at 489.

64. Id.
65. See id. at 492.
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of such a relationship, one party must justifiably place confidence
in the other party and expect that the other party would protect it
from a particular risk so that, as a result of this trust, the first party,
relaxes the level of care and attention that it would ordinarily
exercise.66 Here, the court stated:
JNL in no way mislead [sic] [Mr. and Mrs. Deramus] into any
inaction. JNL never promised [them] that JNL would warn
them of any medical risks to their health, nor did JNL ever
advise [them] that its silence as to the specific result of the
medical examination should be construed as a positive medical
finding ....

This set of circumstances hardly shows any

justifiable reliance by [Mr. and Mrs. Deramus] that JNL would
do anything other than perform the limited function of a life
insurance business. Moreover, there is absolutely no proof that
[Mr. and Mrs. Deramus] in any way relaxed the care and
vigilance that they would normally have exercised in looking
out after their own health conditions ....
The court also rejected Deramus' second argument which
asserted that JNL had a duty to protect life and limb as a result of
requiring Frank Deramus to submit to a blood test and other such
medical examinations. 8 The court found this argument unconvincing for two reasons. First, relying on general principles of
common law, the court explained that JNL had a duty to act
reasonably in its business dealings with the Deramuses, but that
duty did not extend to matters occurring outside of this limited
scope or matters for which JNL was not responsible.69 The court
reasoned that because, "JNL did not infect [Deramus] with HIV,"
it was "under no obligation to inform [him] that he was so infected,
even though this may have been the morally correct thing to
70

do.1

The second reason the court gave for the inapplicability of the
duty to protect life and limb was that JNL is an insurance company
not a doctor.7 The court said that such a heightened duty of care
and disclosure is expected and required from physicians who have

66. See id.
67. Id. at 492.
68. See Deramus, 944 F. Supp. at 493-95.

69. See id at 493.
70. Id. at 495.
71. See id at 493,
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"sworn to protect and respect human life., 72 However, an
insurance company, "by insuring those individuals it perceives as
'insurable,' is here to soften the blow of natural and artificial
disasters" and, therefore, should not be held to the physician's high
standard of care.73
In addition, Jody Deramus also claimed that JNL had a duty
to warn of foreseeable harm. 4 In rejecting this point as a ground
for JNL's liability, the court focused primarily on causation issues.
The court found no evidence showing that JNL's failure to disclose
Frank Deramus' test results proximately caused his eventual death.
The court reasoned as follows: Frank Deramus was HIV positive
before applying for life insurance; he was on notice that JNL found
him uninsurable for medical reasons; he knew that JNL had
conducted tests on both his blood and urine; and he was under
private and independent medical care.
With respect to his
personal medical treatment, the court further noted that Mr.
Deramus himself told his physician "that he had no reason to
suspect he had AIDS, a statement which persuaded the hospital
physician not to test for the disease."76 For all of these reasons,
the court entered judgment in favor of JNL.
In Jane Doe v. Prudential Insurance Company,77 the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland was confronted
with a similar issue. Here, Jane Doe applied for life insurance with
Prudential and, as a part of the application process, she received a
blood test.78 Before submitting to the test, Jane signed an informed consent form specifically stating that, unless precluded by
law, her blood sample could be tested for the AIDS virus as well
as for the presence of certain drugs. 9 The results of her blood
test revealed that Jane was HIV positive."0 Based on this fact,
Prudential rejected her application and sent her a letter explaining

72. Id. at 495.

73. Deramus, 944 F. Supp. at 495.
74. See id. at 495-96. Deramus also claimed that JNL owed her and her husband a duty
of good faith and fair dealing arising out the contractual duty existing between her husband
and JNL. The court, however, summarily disposed of this argument by stating that a
contractual relationship did not exist with respect to the 1988 application. See id. at 495.
75. See id. at 496.
76. Id. at 497.
77. 860 F. Supp. 243 (D. Md. 1993).
78. See id. at 245.
79. See id. at 246.
80. See id.

19971

FEDERAL INSURANCE DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION

that its decision was based on the results of her blood test.81 At
the time of this rejection, Jane was eight months pregnant and a
frequent drug user.82 Therefore, "she believed . . . that her
application had been rejected either because of a condition related
to her pregnancy or because her blood test had revealed the
presence of illegal drugs."83 Fearful of the latter, Jane asked
Prudential to send her the test results directly and exclusively.84
Prudential refused to honor her request offering instead to send the
Jane and her husband, worried that
results to her physician.
their child would be taken from them at birth if their doctor
learned about her drug use, once again asked Prudential that the
results be disclosed only to them.86 Again, Prudential refused.87
According to Prudential, they preferred to disclose sensitive
medical information, such as an HIV positive test result, to the
applicant's physician rather than to the applicant "so that the
physician could then explain ... the significance of the test results
and make appropriate recommendations concerning counseling and
treatment." 88 At trial, Prudential furthered explained that,
regardless of this preference, the company's policy was to release
medical information directly to the rejected applicant upon request
by the applicant.89 Aware of the company's policy, Jane's local
Prudential agent prepared a letter for her to send to the company
and provided it to her with a stamped and addressed envelope.90
However, she never signed or sent it." On October 15, 1991,
more than twenty months after her application blood test, Jane
learned she was HIV positive while being treated for a wrist
injury.

92

81. See id.
82. See PrudentialIns. Co., 860 F. Supp. at 245.
83. Id. at 247.
84. See id. Jane Doe was also under the impression that her results did not indicate any
type of serious condition. Her Prudential agent had reassuringly told her that "erroneous
rejections were common occurrences and that she should not worry about her blood test
because it was probably just 'another mistake."' Id. at 246.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 246.
87. See Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. at 247.
88. Id. at 246.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. at 247
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Upon discovering that Prudential had known of her HIV
infection since February 1990, Jane filed suit against the insurance
company. She claimed that Prudential had breached its duty to her
by failing to disclose the results of her blood test, and, as a result
of that breach, she was deprived of "an early opportunity to obtain
appropriate and necessary medical treatment, which would have
significantly increased her life expectancy."93 The court, unconvinced by the arguments that Jane offered to support this allegation, entered judgment in favor of Prudential.94
In deciding that
Prudential did not owe Jane a duty of disclosure, the court looked
to both statutory and common law. In its statutory analysis, the
court failed to find any legislatively imposed duty under Maryland
state law. 5 At the same time, however, the court pointed to
thirteen other states whose legislatures had enacted statutes
imposing an affirmative duty of disclosure on insurance companies.96 According to the court, such legislative action suggested
that a common law duty of disclosure did not exist.97
In its more traditional duty analysis, the court started from the
premise that "the duty element in a negligence action is merely 'an
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which
lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.' 98
Such considerations of policy include:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered the injury, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,

93. Id. at 245. In her lawsuit against Prudential, Jane Doe also asserted additional
theories of recovery including strict liability, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. On these counts, the court found for Prudential holding that the facts asserted did
not present a viable cause of action. See id. at 249-250.
94. Admittedly, Jane Doe is not a very sympathetic plaintiff. However, the fact remains
that Prudential had, in its exclusive possession, critical life-determinative information;
regardless of their internal policies, they were under no legal obligation to disclose this
information. Arguably, the court should have at least found that Prudential owed Jane Doe
a legal duty even if the court found that Prudential, because of its actions, did not breach its
duty to disclose. By failing to find that Prudential even owed Doe a duty, her culpable
behavior seems irrelevant and inconsequential.
95. See PrudentialIns. Co., 860 F. Supp. at 251.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Id. (quoting Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756, 758 (Md. 1986) (quoting W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 358 (5th ed.
1984)).
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the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden
to the defendant and the consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved,' 9
Without ever applying these considerations of policy to the instant
case, the court unilaterally concluded that a duty of disclosure did
not exist.lc
However, the court's analysis did not end here. It continued
by applying the remaining elements of a negligence action to the
instant case. While considering the breach element, the court said
that even if a duty of disclosure had existed, Prudential had
certainly fulfilled it. 1 ' By the court's standards, Prudential's
willingness to release Jane's test results to her physician satisfied
any existing duty.,02 The court further found that Prudential was
not the legal cause of the harm from which Jane suffered."0 3
Rather, Jane was legally responsible for own injuries. For, "[olne
simple act on Jane's part would have avoided any harm which
resulted from her failure to know in February of 1990 that she was
HIV-positive."'
Since she had taken drugs intravenously,
engaged in unprotected sex with other intravenous drug users, had
been denied insurance coverage, and knew that her blood sample
might have been tested for the AIDS virus, the court held that Jane
was in a position to suspect that something might be wrong and to
take the necessary steps to find if and what it was."0 5 Jane was
found to be contributorily negligent and was, therefore, barred
from recovery.

99. Id. (quoting Village of Cross Keys, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 556 A.2d 1126
(Md. 1989) (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976)).
The Deramus court also cited these factors in its opinion. See Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 944 F. Supp. 488, 496 (S.D. Miss, 1995). In Deramus, these considerations were placed
in a footnote but were never evaluated. See id. at 496 n,8. For a more detailed discussion
of these policy considerations, see infra Part V.B.
100. In deciding this issue, the Prudentialcourt also addressed the physician distinction
that was discussed in Deramus. By finding that "[no professional and expert position was
assumed by Prudential with respect to Jane's physical condition and well-being when it
conducted the blood test in question," the Prudentialcourt reached the same conclusion as
the Deramus court. See PrudentialIns. Co., 860 F. Supp. at 252.
101. See id.at 253.
102.
103.
104.
105,

See id.
See id. at 255.
Id. at 254.
See PrudentialIns. Co., 860 F. Supp. at 254-55.
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Similarly, the Ohio Court of Appeals focused on the causation
element in deciding for the defendant insurance company in Meinze
v. Holmes."° In Meinze, the plaintiff--the administratrix of his
estate-claimed that the insurance company's failure to reveal test
results to William Meinze in a timely manner resulted in his death
from a heart attack.1" Approximately two years before his death,
William Meinze had suffered a nonfatal heart attack. 8 During
his hospitalization, doctors performed several tests,'0 9 determined
that Meinze had only a partial coronary blockage, and prescribed
a relatively minor course of treatment."' After this diagnosis,
Meinze applied for disability benefits from the Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association ("TIAA")."' In order to qualify for
disability payments, TIAA required Meinze to undergo two
independently conducted medical examinations."' Both of the
physicians who examined Meinze strongly believed that he had
been previously misdiagnosed and that the treatment he was
receiving was inadequate. 1 3 These assessments were reported
directly to TIAA with recommendations that Meinze should change
his current treatment and avoid heavy physical exertion." 4
TIAA, however, did not inform Meinze of these medical reports."1 5
Three months after the physicians delivered their reports to
TIAA and upon Meinze's insistence, TIAA forwarded the test
106. 532 N.E.2d 170 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). Although this case involved a disability
insurer as opposed to a life insurer, this case presents issues which are factually and legally
relevant to those considered in the Prudential and Deramus cases, as evidenced by both
courts' consideration of it in their respective opinions. See generally Doe v. Jackson Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488 (S.D, Miss. 1995); PrudentialIns. Co., 860 F. Supp. at 243.
107. See Meinze, 532 N.E.2d at 170-71.
108. See id. at 171.
109. See id. A coronary arteriography is a diagnostic test used to determine whether or
not there is a blockage in the arteries, and if so, the degree and location of the blockage.
See THE OXFORD MEDICAL COMPANION 68 (1994); Lawrence Altman, M.D., The Doctor's
World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1982, at C3.
110. See Meinze, 532 N.E.2d at 171.
1ll. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. These exam results were disclosed to TIAA because, under their contract,
the physicians were permitted to report their findings only to TIAA. See id. In his report,
one of the physicians informed TIAA that "[Meinze] is at considerable risk for developing
another acute myocardial infarction. His physical activities should be significantly restricted
and rehabilitation to gainful employment could only be considered following more aggressive
medic.1 management and coronary artery bypass surgery." Id. at 172.
115. See Meinze, 532 N.E.2d at 174.
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results to Meinze's attorney in April and September of 1983.116
Meinze died on January 5, 1984 after suffering a fatal heart attack
which might
have been prevented with immediate and proper
17
treatment.'
Regardless of this possibility, the court entered judgment for
TIAA.' In reaching this conclusion, the court found that TIAA
owed Meinze a duty of disclosure and that, more importantly,
TIAA's actions had fulfilled this duty. 9 The court said, "[t]his
duty arises because the physician has examined the insured
personally or has reviewed his confidential medical records, and he
has thus assumed a professional and expert position with respect to
the insured's physical condition and well-being, even though a
doctor-patient relationship has not been created."'' The precise
duty owed by TIAA in this case was the duty "to communicate the
opinions of the examining physicians about the quality of treatment
either to the treating physician or to the patient-insured."''
Since TIAA ultimately forwarded the medical files to Meinze's
attorney, TIAA fulfilled its duty.'22 In the court's opinion,
Meinze's attorney acted as his agent, and, therefore, any disclosure
made to the attorney was the equivalent of disclosing the information directly to Meinze. 12'
Furthermore, the court stated that even if there was a breach,
TIAA would not be found liable because the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate any causal connection between TIAA's conduct and
Meinze's suffering and subsequent death.'24 In this case, as in
Prudentialand Deramus,the causation element-the most difficult
element to prove--was the final barrier preventing the plaintiff's
recovery.

116. See id. at 171-72. One doctor submitted his report to TIAA on January 7, 1983.
More than three months later, in April 1983, TIAA delivered a copy of this report to
Meinze's attorney. See id. The other doctor submitted his report to TIAA on June 27, 1983.

This second
117. See
118. See
119. See

report was submitted to Meinze's attorney in September of 1983. See id.
id. at 172.
id. at 175.
id. at 174.

120.

Meinze, 532 N.E.2d at 174.

121.
122.
123,
124.

Id. at 174.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 174-75.
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IV. Harms Caused by a Policy of Nonmandatory Disclosure
In reaching their decisions that disclosure is not mandated by
existing law, the courts focused primarily on the law of negligence.
Their holdings are narrow in scope and fail to address the broader
implications of nondisclosure. However, the dangers inherent in
the current system cannot be ignored. Nondisclosure endangers not
only the insurance applicant but also dozens of other third parties
with whom the applicant interacts. The strongest argument in favor
of enacting such federal insurance disclosure laws is the degree of
harm caused by a system of nondisclosure.
A. Loss of Treatment Time
The most basic harm resulting from an insurance company's
failure to inform an individual that she is suffering from a critical
medical condition is the loss of treatment time. Depending on the
illness involved, a delay in medical care can mean that an initially
curable disease has advanced to an untreatable, terminal stage.'21
Take, for example, the previously discussed hypothetical involving
the male applicant who was diagnosed with advanced prostatic
cancer thirteen months after his insurance company had already
discovered his illness. During the time that the insurance company
knew of his cancerous condition and he did not, his cancer most
likely spread throughout his body. Such a progression significantly
decreases the likelihood of curability or remission. 26
125. Early diagnosis is secondary only to prevention in surviving cancer. Similar to heart
disease, in which early recognition and prompt initiation of therapy for coronary insufficiency
can prevent fatal heart attacks, early diagnosis and early treatment are significant factors in
improving the chance of curability. See ERROL C. FRIEDBERG, M.D., CANCER ANSWERS;
ENCOURAGING ANSWERS TO 25 QUESTIONS YOU WERE ALWAYS AFRAID TO ASK 148

(W.H. Freeman) (1992); Walter C. Willett et al., Strategies for Minimizing Cancer Risk,
WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CANCER 37-44 (1997); Cancer Research, Cancer
Survivorship(visited Sept. 21, 1997) <http://rex.nci.nih.gov/massmedia/CANCER-RESRCHWEBSITE/SURVIVE.html>. In addition, recent medical findings have documented that
early diagnosis of the HIV infection and early therapy with the current antiviral agents can
significantly, and in some cases indefinitely, delay the onset of the AIDS syndrome. See
Geoffrey Cowley, AIDS treatment: Targeting a Deadly Scrap of Genetic Code, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 2, 1996, at 68; HIV/AIDS, Effectiveness of Early Detection (visited Sept. 21, 1997)
<http://text.nlm.nih.gov/tempfiles/tempBrPg56591 ?t=874869233&lineK=&hitK=&docK=6>.
126. See CancerNet, Prostate CancerStaging (last modified Feb. 1995)<http://www.cancer,med.umich.edu/prostcan/staging.html>. In its early stages, prostate cancer is "localized
(confined) to the gland and the majority of patients with localized prostate cancer have a
long survival after diagnosis." National Cancer Institute, Cancer Facts. Detection (last
modified Nov. 1995) <http://icicc.ni.nih.gov/clinpdq/detection/Questions and Answers_-

1997]

FEDERAL INSURANCE DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION

149

Admittedly, an argument can be made that the lost treatment
time is not the fault of the insurance company. Applicants such as
Doe and Deramus, whose applications are rejected, should be on
notice that something might be wrong and should seek medical
help. An even stronger argument can be made with respect to
applicants like Meinze who are aware that they are suffering from
a serious illness and are receiving private medical care. However,
regardless of this implied notice and actual knowledge, the fact still
remains that under the current nondisclosure system, insurance
companies can exclusively control information that might save or
prolong lives.
B.

Health Risk to Others

In addition to loss of treatment time, the failure to disclose an
applicant's medical condition can result in serious health risks to
third parties. Individuals with whom an applicant interacts
intimately, socially, and professionally can be unknowingly exposed
to a life threatening disease.
AIDS is such a disease. 7 The AIDS virus is in the blood,
semen, or vaginal secretions of an infected individual and can be
spread by sexual contact, by exposure to contaminated blood, and
by an HIV infected mother." The transmission rate of the HIV
virus is so high that the virus has reached epidemic proportions.
However, the real concern is that virus has spread relentlessly even
though transmission and infection of the virus are highly prevent-

About-EarlyProstate Cancer.htnil>. However, if the cancer has spread to distant organs,
it is incurable and the patient has a predicted life expectancy of one to three years. See
Prostate Cancer Staging, supra.
127. Today, AIDS is one of the leading causes of death among men, women, and
children. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that I out every 250
Americans is infected with the AIDS virus and estimates that "hundreds of thousands more
Americans will become infected before the year 2000." CDC National AIDS Clearinghouse,
HI V Infection & AIDS: A Status Report (visited Sept. 22,1997) <http://www.healthtouch.com/level I/leaflets/aids/aids070.htm>.
128. See CDC National AIDS Clearinghouse, HIV & Its Transmission (visited Sept. 22,
1997) <http://www.healthtouch.com/levell/leaflets/aids/aids045.htm>. Sharing needles or
syringes with an HIV infected individual is the most common way the virus spreads through
exposure to contaminated blood. However, "in the health-care setting, workers have been
infected with HIV after being stuck with needles containing HIV infected blood or, less
frequently, after infected blood gets into the worker's bloodstream through an open cut or
splashes into a mucous membrane." Id. Additionally, HIV infected women may spread the
virus to a fetus in utero, to a baby during birth, or through breast feeding after birth. See
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able. 29 To prevent the spread of AIDS, individuals need to be
educated about the virus and need to be informed about their own
status.
For the eighteen months that JNL knew of his infection when
he did not, Frank Deramus not only failed to receive treatment, but
he also unintentionally exposed numerous people to the virus.13
Unaware of his deadly and contagious condition, Deramus was
unable to take the necessary safety precautions to prevent the
spread of the HIV virus. First, Deramus continually put his wife
" ' As Jody
at risk as the couple attempted to conceive a child.13
Deramus described, "In sleeping in my husband's arms, the safest
place I knew of, I was sleeping with one of the deadliest diseases
known to mankind.', 132 In addition, numerous physicians and
nurses were also put at risk of contracting the AIDS virus.'33
Despite the obvious health risks that an unsuspecting HIV positive
individual poses to others, JNL chose not to disclose Deramus' test
results.
Similarly, during the twenty months that Jane Doe was
unaware of her HIV positive status, dozens of people were placed
at risk including the physicians and nurses who delivered Jane's
child; l" Jane's husband, who was exposed during unprotected
sexual intercourse; and Jane's baby, who was exposed to the virus
Jane's husband has since tested positive
each time he nursed.'
36
Consequently, the couple's child, who is
for the HIV virus.'
almost
certainly lose both his parents to
HIV negative,
will
13 7
AIDS.
129. See CDC National AIDS Clearinghouse, A Message from the Surgeon General on
HIV/AIDS

(visited

Sept. 22,

1997)

<http://www.healthtouch.com/levell/leaflets/aids-

/aids069.htm> [hereinafter Message from the Surgeon General].
130. See Telephone Interview with Jody Deramus, supra note 7; Brief on Behalf of
Appellant Jane Doe at 7-8, Deramus v.Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.
1996) (No. 95-60675).
131. See Telephone Interview with Jody Deramus, supra note 7.

Jody Deramus has

repeatedly tested negative for the HIV virus. See id.
132. Curtis Rist, Deadly Secret, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Oct. 7, 1996, at 73, 76.

133. See id. at 73; Telephone Interview with Jody Deramus, supra note 7.
134. See Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243, 247 (D. M.

1993).

135. See id.
136. See id.
137. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "most of the babies
born to HIV-infected mothers will not have HIV infection, but they will probably become
orphans because their mothers and, often their fathers, are infected and will likely die before
the child is grown." CDC National AIDS Clearinghouse, How You Get HIV (visited Sept.
21, 1997) <http:healthtouch.com/levell/leaflets/aids/aids072.htm>.
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Again, an argument can be made that prevention of these

serious health risks is the responsibility of the individuals involved
and not of the insurance companies. However, AIDS affects
everyone, and when an insurance company has information that
could potentially save numerous lives, it should be required to
disclose such information. As the Surgeon General imploringly
said to the American public: "We need to know how deeply HIV
and AIDS affect our communities. We must care for those infected
with and affected by HIV and we must prevent further infections.""'
V.

Legal Arguments in Favor of Enacting Federal Disclosure

Legislation
Beyond these compelling health considerations, there is a
strong legal basis supporting the enactment of federal insurance
disclosure legislation.
A. Risk-Utility Formula
The tort of negligence directs individuals to act reasonably and
imposes liability on those individuals who do not act with ordinary
care. Judge Learned Hand's famous risk-utility formula gives
significance and meaning to this concept of ordinary care.'39 It
transforms the abstract theory of "reasonableness" into an
understandable framework which, "if followed will bring about
the ... the efficient, cost-justified level of accidents and safe-

ty."'
Significantly, the goal of American negligence law is to
create a liability system that produces cost-justified rules of
safety. 4 '
Application of Judge Learned Hand's risk-utility formula
strongly suggests that insurance companies should inform applicants
of the results of their examinations. Although the American
Council of Life Insurance believes that "it is not appropriate for
insurance companies to deliver the bad news,', 142 a balancing of

138. Message from the Surgeon General, supra note 129 (emphasis added).
139. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972).
140. Id.

141. See DAN DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 160 (1993).
142. Telephone Interview with Ginny Bueno, Spokeswoman for the American Council
of Life Insurance (June 23, 1997). The American Council of Life Insurance believes that
"[ilsurance companies are not in the business of breaking bad news to applicants. People
should not open a latter and find out they have AIDS." Chuck Jones, I Know Something

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 102:1

the relevant and critical factors demonstrates that companies should
disclose this information.
According to Hand's theory, to determine the duty element in
a negligence case, three things should be considered: 1) the
probability that the accident will occur if no precautions are taken;
2) the magnitude of the injury if the accident occurs; and 3) the
burden of taking precautions that would prevent the accident.143
"If the probability be called, P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P:
i.e., whether B is less than PL."" To apply the formula to this
issue, it is first necessary to identify and contextualize the applicable terms.
The magnitude of the injury if the insurance company does not
disclose the life-threatening information (L) is the exacerbation of
the illness because of lost treatment time or death of the ill
applicant as well as the possible infection of third parties. Clearly,
because of the potential loss of human life, the resulting injuries are
of the greatest and most serious magnitude. The likelihood that
such injuries will occur if the insurance company does not disclose
the life threatening information (P) is also very high as an individual who does not know she is sick will do nothing to help herself.
Lastly, the burden (B) on the insurance company of informing the
applicant of her illness is, in comparison, insignificant. 45 The
insurance company could simply add another paragraph to their
rejection letters. The letter would not have to explicitly state the
applicant's illness or medical condition. It would only need to
explain that the results of the applicant's medical tests indicated
that the applicant might have a very serious illness and should see
a physician immediately. Furthermore, the letter should include a
list of the tests that the insurance company conducted as well as
explain the procedure by which the applicant, if she wishes, could

You Don't Know, LIFE ASS'N NEWS, November 1996, at 41.

However, the Council has

stated that it is supportive of applicant accessibility to health information. See Telephone
Interview with Ginny Bueno, supra.
143. See United States v. Carroll 'rowing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
144. Id. at 173.
145. JNL, in its suit against Jody Deramus, never asserted "that there was a significant
cost associated with informing the [Deramuses] of the HIV infection diagnosis," Reply Brief
on Behalf of Appellant Jane Doe at 14, Deramus v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 274
(5th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-60675). In fact, since 1993, JNL has been actively notifying an
applicant's physician if the result of the company required HIV blood test was positive. See

Life Insurer Has No Duty, supra note 12, at D-5.
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have the company disclose the test result directly to her or her
doctor. PL, the product of the seriousness of the danger involved
multiplied by the likelihood that the ill or infected applicant would
lose treatment time, die, or infect other individuals with a lifethreatening illness substantially outweighs B, the inconsequential
burden that disclosure places on insurance companies.
Because of the minor burden disclosure imposes and the
significant and probable risks to life that a policy of nondisclosure
presents, insurance companies should have a legal duty of disclosure. For, "[i]f... the benefits in accident avoidance exceed the
cost of prevention, society is better off if those costs are incurred
'
Therefore, even though "it is
and the accident is averted. 146
standard insurance industry practice to release medical tests results
to an applicant's physician if the test reveals a serious condition,"' 47 leaving it to the insurance companies to decide is not
good enough. Insurance companies should not be in the position
to decide whether or not such critical information reaches the
concerned appiicant; they should be legally obligated to disclose it.
In fact, these standard practices of the industry support the
imposition of a duty on the companies. If the majority of the
companies are already releasing this medical information, actual
disclosure must not be excessively burdensome. Additionally, the
cost-effectiveness of requiring the companies to disclose this
information is further evidenced by the twenty states that have
already enacted statutes to this effect. All of these considerations
strongly suggest that insurance disclosure legislation is the most
efficient and cost-justified safety mechanism.
B. Policy Considerationsin Favor of Finding a Duty of Care
In reaching their decisions that insurance companies do not
owe a duty of disclosure, both the Deramus and Prudentialcourts
alluded to important considerations of policy. The Prudentialcourt
stated that "duty element in a negligence action is merely 'an
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which
lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection." '
Similarly, the Deramus court recognized that "the policy factors
which must be considered in determining whether a duty exists

146. Posner, supra note 139, at 33.
147. Jones, supra note 142, at 41.
148. Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243, 251 (D. Md. 1993).
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have been judicially defined."' 149 According to the courts, such
considerations of policy include:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered the injury, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,
the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden
to the defendant and the consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach, and availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for
the risk involved. 150
Surprisingly, the courts did not engage in any further analysis
of these considerations. They simply listed them and continued on
with other aspects of the decision.'51 However, if the courts had
examined and balanced these policy considerations, most likely they
would have concluded that a duty of disclosure was owed by the
insurance companies.
Examination of considerations, such as the foreseeability of
harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered the injury, and the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, results in a finding of
a duty to disclose. As discussed above, the foreseeability and
likelihood that such injuries will occur if the insurance company
does not disclose the life threatening information is very high as an
individual who does not know that she is sick will not procure
medical treatment and will not take the necessary safety precautions to prevent the infection of third persons. Likewise, the
certainty that the individual suffered the injury is significant. For,
as defined by this comment, the injury suffered does not refer to
the initial contraction of the virus or disease; rather, it refers to the
worsening of the applicant's medical condition and the infection of
third parties. By not requiring insurance companies to disclose this
critical health information when they become aware of it, there is
an extremely high likelihood that the individual's medical condition
will become progressively more serious. Clearly, there is a definite

149. Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488, 496 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
150. Prudential, 860 F. Supp. at 251 (quoting Village of Cross Keys, Inc. v. United States
Gypsum Co., 556 A.2d 1126 (Md. 1989) (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551
P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976)).
151. See Duranus, 944 F. Supp. at 496; Prudential, 860 F. Supp. at 251.
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connection between the nondisclosure by the insurance company
and the aggravated health of the individual. The companies are in
sole possession of the examination and test results and, accordingly,
are in a position to release this vital health information.
The remaining considerations further support a policy of
mandatory disclosure. These considerations focus on the logistics
of disclosure and address the consequences of a disclosure policy
on the entire community as well as on the defendant insurer. From
a practical standpoint, the companies should disclose this information because they possess it and know when disclosure is necessary.
Therefore, they could inform the affected individuals in the most
efficient manner. Furthermore, for the reasons stated previously-including the facts that disclosure is already standard industry
practice and that over twenty states currently mandate it, imposing
a legal duty of disclosure on insurance companies is not excessively
burdensome. The slightness of the burden is even more apparent
upon consideration of the potential benefits realized by the
community. Such benefits include the preservation of life by
facilitating early medical treatment for Fick individuals and by
helping to protect healthy third persons from infection, the
attainment of an interest in one's own personal information, and
the protections gained by a definite legal standard. Again, the
benefits to the community significantly outweigh any minor
inconvenience placed upon the insurance company.
Even though the courts did not engage in an analysis of these
considerations of policy, a balancing strongly favors the imposition
of a duty of disclosure on insurance companies. The burden on the
defendant is minor in comparison to the benefits bestowed upon
the applicants and the community. In addition, these policy
considerations seem to be an expression of Learned Hand's riskutility formula. Generally, the considerations focused on the
foreseeability of the harm, the certainty and seriousness of the
harm, and the burden of preventing the harm on the defendant.
Just as balancing Hand's factors strongly suggests that insurance
companies should inform applicants, balancing these policy
considerations also supports the imposition of this duty. Both
policy and risk-utility considerations indicate that, in order for
Americans to be truly protected, a legal duty of disclosure must be
imposed on insurance companies.
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C. Employers and Their Duty to Disclose
Insurance companies are not the only institutions t tat require
individuals to submit to medical examinations for their own benefit.
Many businesses, concerned with enhancing their workforce's
productivity, perform medical screening examinations and use
monitoring devices.152 However, unlike insurance companies, the
law has imposed upon employers a duty to disclose the results of
the medical examinations to both prospective and actual employees 53 By imposing this legal duty on employers, courts have
attempted to ensure that no treatment time is lost'54 and that
others are not unknowingly put at risk 55 This duty serves to
protect employees, their co-workers, and their families.
Courts concluding that employers owe their prospective and
actual employees a duty to disclose have applied a basic tort
analysis. They began with the general principle as set forth in the
Second Restatement of Torts which states that "the fact that the
actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary
for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him
a duty to take such action." '56 The courts have held this to mean
that "employers owe no duty to their employees to ascertain
whether they are physically fit for the job they seek." '57 They
have decided, however, that when an employer assumes such a

152. See Stacy J. Bagley, Enough Is Enough! Congress and the Courts React to
Employers'MedicalScreening and Surveillance Procedures,99 DICK. L. REV. 723,725 (1995).
153. See Annotation, Master's Liability for Failure to Inform Servant of Disease or
Physical Condition Disclosed by Medical Examination, 69 A.L.R.2d 1213 (1995).
154. See, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229, 231 (6th Cir.
1956) (naming employee's missed opportunity to seek medical treatment as one of the
reasons employer owed employee a duty of disclosure); Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp.
238, 241 (D. D.C. 1974) (deciding employer had a duty to disclose the results of a preemployment physical because of the resulting delay in treatment time that employee
suffered).
155. See, e.g., Dornak v. Lafayette Gen. Hosp., 399 So. 2d 168 (La. 1981) (holding that
employer had a duty of disclosure especially in light of the risk that plaintiff posed to coworkers and patients); Wojcik v. Aluminum Co., 183 N.Y.S.2d 351, 358 (N.Y. App. Div.
1959) (holding not only that employer had a duty to disclose to his employee but also to his
employee's wife who was in danger of contracting a contagious disease).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965),
157. Coffee v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 503 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Cal. 1972). The court
cites other courts who have interpreted the Restatement in this manner. See generally
Gunston v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 349,352 (N.D. Cal. 1964); McGuigan v. Southern Pac,
Co., 277 P.2d 444 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Isgett v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R Co., 332 F.
Supp. 1127, 1141 (D, S.C. 1971).
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duty, he assumes an obligation to make sure the examinations are
conducted with care."5 8 The courts have limited this duty of care
by holding employers responsible for a failure to disclose known
abnormalities or illnesses.'59 This limitation results in employers
owing only a duty to disclose and not a duty to discover.' 6°
Therefore, when an employer requires an employee to submit to a
medical examination, he must inform the employee about any life
threatening or serious medical conditions of which he learns.
One of the earliest cases to impose this duty on employers was

Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America. 6'

In this case, Joseph

Wojcik underwent an employer required x-ray examination.1 62
The x-rays of Wojcik's chest revealed that he had tuberculosis.' 63
His employer, however, failed to inform him of his highly contaThe court held that not
gious and potentially fatal disease."
only did the employer owe a duty of care to Wojcik, but he also
owed a duty of care to Wojcik's wife. 165 In finding a duty to
disclose in this case, the court focused on the dangers inherent in
not mandating employers to reveal such critical information. The
court reasoned that "the defendant could have reasonably anticipated that the plaintiff-husband, without knowledge of his contagious
disease, would not take the precautionary measures necessary to

158. See Jines v. General Elec. Co., 303 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1962); Union Carbide, 237 F.2d
at 229; James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Coffee, 503 P.2d at 1366;
Dornak, 399 So. 2d at 168; Wojcik, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 351, The courts based the employer's
assumption of duty on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). That section
states:

[O]ne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from
his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking if his failure to
exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or the harm is suffered because
of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
Id.
159. See Lotspeich v. Chance Vought Aircraft, 369 S.W.2d 705,710 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963)
(holding that employer did not have a duty to disclose employee's tubercular condition
because he lacked knowledge of the condition).
160. Employers do not have a duty to discover an employee's medical condition.
Liability of an employer to an employee for a failure to disclose is premised on the
employer's inaction in the face of knowledge. See Jines, 303 F.2d at 79-80; Coffee, 503 P.2d
at 1370-71; Wojcik, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 357; Lotspeich, 369 S.W.2d at 710.
161. 183 N.Y.S.2d 351.
162. See id. at 353.
163. See id.
164. See id.

165. See id. at 358.
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prevent infecting others, including his wife, with the germs of the
disease."'" This risk of infection is identical to the risks posed
in the Deramus and Prudentialcases. In all of these cases, a failure
to disclose the results of a medical examination put others in
danger of acquiring a life-threatening disease. The Wojcik court,
however, decided that such conduct was unacceptable and unlawful.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana reached a similar conclusion
in Dornak v. Lafayette General Hospital.67 In Dornak, the court
held that the hospital owed a prospective employee a duty to
disclose her tubercular condition which it discovered during a
required pre-employment medical examination." s In reaching its
decision, the court focused on the dangers posed by not disclosing
such information and the ease with which this information could
have been disclosed. The court said: "To notify plaintiff of the
findings would have been a simple matter not requiring the
professional skill of a physician and not imposing an undue burden
169
upon an administrative or personnel official of the hospital."
The degree of burden imposed on the hospital in this case is no less
of a burden than that which would be imposed on insurance
companies to disclose like information. Furthermore, the balancing
of these two considerations-the burden of disclosure versus the
benefits of disclosure-unquestionably results in a policy favoring
the imposition of a duty to disclose on employers as well as
insurers.
In James v. United States7 ' and Coffee vi McDonnell-Douglas
Corp.,7 ' the courts based their findings of a duty to disclose on
the loss of treatment time that results from an employer's failure
to inform. In both of these cases, the pre-employment examinations revealed that the employee was suffering from a form of cancer. 7 Neither of these men were informed of their condition; as
a result, they lost valuable treatment time and, most likely, stages
of their lives.'73 The courts held that "having assumed the duty
to examine plaintiff, defendant also assumed the duty to conduct

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Wojcik, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 358
399 So, 2d 168, 170-71 (La. 1961).
See id. at 170.
Id.
483 F. Stipp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
503 P.2d 1366 (Cal. 1972).

172. See James, 483 F. Supp. at 583; Coffee, 503 P.2d at 1367.
173. See James, 483 F. Supp. at 584-88; Coffee, 503 P.2d at 1369.
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'
Therefore, the
and complete the examination with due care."174
employers owed their prospective employees a duty to disclose the
results of their medical exams.
In deciding that prospective and actual employees are owed a
duty of disclosure, the courts have also focused on the issue of
reliance. In Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton,175 the
court held that the employer had a duty to disclose the results of
the employee's x-ray examinations which indicated that he was
suffering from tuberculosis.176 In addition to loss of treatment
time and the ease with which disclosure could have been made, the
court based its decision on the employee's belief that he would be
informed of any abnormalities. 77 The court said that the employer's silence "permitted Stapleton to rely upon a tacit assurance of
safety despite its knowledge of the existence of danger."' 78 The
court further stressed the significance of the reliance factor by
stating that "Stapleton was entitled.., to rely on the expectation
that he would be told of any dangerous condition actually disclosed
by the examination."'79
For purposes of reliance, there is no difference between an
employee examinee and an insurance applicant examinee. Both
must submit to physical examinations and medical tests and,
therefore, are understandably susceptible to reliance. As the court
stated in Betesh v. United States,180 "the examinee generally
assumes that 'no news is good news' and relies on the assumption
that any serious condition will be revealed."'1 8' Therefore, in
order to prevent unwarranted assumptions of healthiness, insurance
companies should have the same duty of disclosure as employers.
Certainly, no significant differences exist between these cases
and the ones involving insurance companies. Insurers should be
held to the same reasonable standards as their analogous counterparts. Employers who require their prospective and actual
employees to submit to medical examinations are acting in their
own self-interest. They are using the exam results to assess an

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Coffee, 503 P.2d at 1370.
237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956),
See id. at 231.
See id. at 231-33,
Id. at 232.
Id. at 232.
400 F. Supp. 238 (D. D.C. 1974).

181. Id. at 246.
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individual's ability and suitability for employment, 8 ' much in the
same way insurance companies test to determine the insurability of
an applicant. Just as insurance companies may use the results of
their examinations to deny coverage, employers may use the test
results to "exclude people from jobs."1 83 Insurers and employers
even use many of the same medical tests to make their decisions.
Employers require their employees to submit to x-rays, urine
samples, blood tests, and HIV tests."' Yet, the most significant
similarity between these two practices is the imbalance of power.
Job applicants have no option but to submit to the screening
examinations. They are "powerless to refuse if they want to be
hired."' 85 Employees, prospective employees, and insurance
applicants have no control over the process. In order to have the
opportunity to secure a job, to keep a job, or to procure insurance,
they have to acquiesce to the demands of the employers and
insurers. Even after the medical examinations are conducted,
applicants and employees remain powerless as they have no control
over the ultimate decision of acceptance or rejection.
The similarities, however, stop here. A major distinction is the
existence of a legal duty. Prospective and actual employees have
the legal right to be informed of their test results; their employers
have a duty to disclose these results. The insurance applicant, on
the other hand, does not have this protection and the insurer does
not have a legal duty.
An additional discrepancy also exists in the legal interest these
two types of examinees are given in their own records. The law
has afforded employees certain rights of access to health care
information possessed by their employers." 6 In Cleghorn v.

182. See Lori B. Andrews, The Human Genome Initiative and the Impact of Genetic

Testing and Technologies: Article: Confidentiality of Genetic Information in the Workplace,
17 AM.
J.L. & MED. 75, 87 (1991).

183. Id. at 75-76.
184. See Green v. Walker, 910 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1990). In addition, employers
sometimes require their prospective and actual employees to undergo mental evaluations.
See Bagley, supra note 152, at 727.
185. Frances H. Miller, Biological Monitoring: The Employer's Dilemma, 9 AM. J.L &
MED. 387, 413 (1984), The author demonstrates that when the common law rights to
personal autonomy and corporate autonomy are accommodated, the prospective employee
is rendered jobless, See id.
186. See Cleghorn v. Hess, 853 P.2d 1260, 1263-64 (Nev. 1993); Bagley, supra note 152,
at 745.
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Hess,"8 the court held that employees who were examined,
tested, and evaluated at the direction of their employers had an
explicit right of access to their test results.' 8 An employee's
interest in her own medical files has also been preserved in various
federal statutes. These federal statutes not only give an employee
the right to access her employer-created medical files, but they also
guarantee confidentiality with respect to the acquired information.'89
Presently, the law does not extend these rights to insured
individuals even though employees and insurers seem to be in
comparable positions.
The courts have offered no sound reason for these distinct
standards especially in light of these striking similarities. The
courts, in making their decisions, pointed to two areas of the law
which, in their opinion, called for the different treatment between
employers and insurers. They began their analyses by looking at
the common law. At common law, an employer had a "duty to
warn an employee of a 'hidden' danger or risk,'" Because "the
insurer does not owe the same duty of safety to its insurers that an
employer owes to its employees,"' 9 the courts said the employer's duty is not transferable; therefore, the cases are distinguishable.'92 Without any further inquiry or discussion about this
common law duty, the courts moved onto their next point of
distinction.
The second reason that the courts offered for their disparate
treatment of employers and insurers was the involvement of
physicians. Employers have a duty to disclose because they have
physicians conduct their medical exams. 93 According to the

187. 853 P.2d 1260.

188. See id. at 1264.
189. See Bagley, supra note 152, at 746. "In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which provides that all medical information obtained by employers during
pre-employment and continuing employment examinations must be collected and maintained
on separate forms, kept in separate medical files, and be treated as confidential medical
records." Id. In addition, the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") also provides
employees with access to all relevant medical records. See Access to Employee Exposure
and Medical Records, 61 Fed. Reg. 31,431 (1996) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R, § 1926.33).
190, Meinze v. Holmes, 532 N.E.2d 170, 173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).

191. Id.
192. See id.; Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488, 493-94 (S.D. Miss.
1995).
193. Applicants, Employees May See Results of Psychological Tests, Court Decides,
HEALTH L. REP, (BNA) No. 2, D-28 (June 28, 1993).
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courts, when a physician has "conducted the exam, provided
medical judgments, or has assumed an advisory role,"'1 94 the
employee examinee has "a right to expect a certain degree of care
and disclosure on their health and health related matters regardless
'
of whether a doctor-patient relationship exists."195
Therefore, the
company's use of a physician is seemingly the definitive factor.
However, this test has a major inconsistency. Insurance companies
use physicians. 96 Every life insurance company has a medical
director who is a licensed physician and whose duties include
reviewing the report of every examination conducted on their
applicants. 97 This point of physician involvement was raised in
the Prudential case. 98 The court, however, never addressed the
physician's participation.
Even though Prudential's medical
director reviewed Jane Doe's test results and, then, personally
denied her application, the court's only response was that "[nI]o
professional and expert position was assumed by Prudential with
'
respect to [her] physical condition."199
Even in cases where the
physician's role has been more direct, the employers standard of
disclosure has not been applied.
In Ervin v. American Guardian Life Assurance Co.2"° ("American"), Thomas Ervin applied for life insurance; in accordance with
the company's policy, he submitted to their underwriting medical
tests.20 American had company physicians conduct the exams and
had the medical director review the reports, 2°2 Within one mornth
of these tests, Ervin died of a heart attack that could have been
prevented with proper treatment.203 Ervin's widow filed suit and
claimed that American "had negligently failed to discover, or, in
the alternative, failed to report to Ervin" that he suffered from
cardiac abnormalities of which they were aware.2
The court
found that neither American nor the physicians owed Ervin a duty

194. Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243, 252 (D. Md. 1993).

195. Deramus, 944 F. Supp. at 494.
196. See MACLEAN, supra note 26, at 357.
197. See id.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
201

See Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. at 243.
See id. at 252.
545 A.2d 354 (Pa. Super. (Ct. 1988),
See id. at 355.
See id.
See id.

204. Id.
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to discover or disclose.2"' Their only duty was to determine
"whether the applicant was an insurable risk." 2' As the court
said in Deramus, the role of insurance companies in our society, is
"to soften the blow of natural and artificial disasters, be it death,
fire or flood."2 "€ This inherent nature of the insurance industry
does not seem to be affected by the involvement of physicians.
Therefore, the role that physicians play in creating a duty of
disclosure does not seem to be as definite as the courts present it.
Once again, the reasons for the different standards for
employers and insurers are unclear. However, federal insurance
disclosure legislation would remedy this discrepancy by mandating
that insured individuals have the same rights of disclosure, access,
and confidentiality as employees. The similarities between these
two classes demand that insurance applicants and policyholders
receive the same legal protections that are afforded to prospective
and actual employees. Applicants and policyholders should be
owed a duty of disclosure, should be granted a right of access to
their personal medical information, and should be given an interest
in their own medical information. The Medical Privacy in the Age
of New Technologies Act would give them this right.
VI. The Medical Privacy in the Age of New Technologies Act
In finding that "health information plays a vital role in every
aspect of an individual's life [and] includes some of the most
sensitive information available about an individual," the drafters
of the Medical Privacy in the Age of New Technologies Act sought
to provide individuals with access to their medical records and to
protect an individual's right of privacy in their health information
by limiting disclosures to third parties.20 8 To guarantee that these
individual interests are respected, the Act not only establishes
comprehensive guidelines, but it also remedies non-compliance
through criminal and civil sanctions.2 9
To ensure that an individual's interest in their own information
would be fully realized, the Act broadly defines the term "protected health information." "Protected health information" means
205. See Ervin, 545 A.2d at 358,
206. Id.
207. Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488, 495 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
208. H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).

209. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
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"any information, including information derived from a biological
sample from the human body and demographic information about
an individual, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium,
210
that is created or received by a health information trustee.
Insurance companies are designated as health information trustees.21 1 "Protected health information" also refers to any information that "relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental
health, predisposition, or condition of an individual, or individuals
related by blood to the individual. ' 2 12 Basically, all obtainable
information about an individual is included in the term "protected
health information." The significance of this all-inclusive definition
becomes clear when considered with respect to the rights granted
by the Act.
In general, the Act states that a health information trustee
must permit an individual to review, inspect, copy, and amend any
protected health information of which they are the subject.213
With one exception, the Act demands that the protected health
information be delivered directly to the concerned individual or, if
the individual should choose, to her designee. 214 The only instance in which the trustee is not required to deliver the information directly to the individual is when such disclosure "reasonably
could be expected to endanger the life or physical or mental safety
'
However, after making such a determinaof any individual."215
tion, the trustee must arrange for alternative disclosure to the
Together, these provisions enable
individual's designee.2 16
individuals to learn and review all the information that has been
acquired about them. Insurance applicants and policyholders would
be able to see their medical information whether they have been
denied coverage or offered coverage at a higher premium. They
would have a legal right to see all the information the insurance
company had regarding them.

210. HR. 1815 § 3(16).
211. See id.§ 3(7)(a). In addition to insurers, the term health information trustee refers
to any person who is a "health care provider, health plan, health oversight agency, public
health authority, health researcher, employer, school, institution of higher education, or
insurance support organization, insofar as the person creates, receives, obtains, maintains,
uses, or transmits protected health information," Id.
212. Id.§ 3(16)(b).
213. See id.§ 101(a).
214. See id.§ 101(b)(1).
215. H.R. 1815, § 101(b)(1).
216. See id.§ 101(b)(2).
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Furthermore, the Act also affords people the right to have
incorrect information changed. Beginning on the day an individual
makes a request to have her protected health information amended,
a trustee has a period of forty-five days to make the change, to
inform the individual of the change, and to make a reasonable
effort to inform any person or entity that has received the incorrect
information of the change. 17 This notification of third parties
provision is an added protection as the Act places many restrictions
on the use and disclosure of protected health information.
The term disclose, "when used with respect to protected health
information that is held by a health information trustee, means to
release, transfer, provide access to, or otherwise divulge the
infoimation to any person other than the individual who is the
2 8 Also included in the definition of
subject of the information.""
disclosure is "the placement of information into a computerized
data base, networked computer system, or any other electronic or
magnetic data system. '219
Health information trustees are only permitted to "disclose
protected health information for purposes of treatment or payment
pursuant to an authorization executed by an individual who is the
subject of the information. 22° The authorization form must be
written and signed by the concerned individual. 221 It must Specifically describe the information to be disclosed, the purpose of the
disclosure, and the recipient of the information,222 It must also
include provisions giving the individual the right to revoke or
amend the authorization and specifying the expiration date of the
authorization.'2
According to the Act, an authorization of
disclosure must expire no later than one year after its execution. 24 After the authorization has expired, the individual must
give her permission for any further disclosure.
Through this authorization and reauthorization process,
individuals are able to exercise control over their own information.
They decide whether or not and on what terms disclosure will

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See id. § 102(a).
Id. § 3(3).
Id.
H.R, 1815, § 202(a).
See id. § 202(a)(1).
See id. § 202(a)(3), (5).
See id. § 202(b).
See id. § 203(a)(3).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:1

occur. Insurance applicants and policyholders can prevent the
spread of their medical and personal information to other insurance
companies through computer database systems and consumer
reporting agencies. Before applicants' and policyholders' protected
health information can be forwarded and transmitted, their
insurance companies must obtain their written consent. Once
permission to disclose has been granted, the Act further protects
individual privacy by limiting the disclosure to the "minimum
amount of information necessary to accomplish the [stated]
'
purpose."225
Only in emergency situations may information be disclosed
without the individual's authorization. The Act permits disclosure
to health care providers or emergency medical personnel to the
extent necessary to protect the concerned individual from serious
and imminent danger or harm.226 Additionally, if a trustee
determines that there is an "identifiable threat of serious injury or
death to an identifiable individual or group of individuals" and
disclosure would significantly reduce the risk of such harm,
disclosure without authorization is permissible.2 27 Under the Act,
public health authorities and law enforcement officers also have the
ability to obtain protected health information from trustees without
the individual's consent. 2 8 With the exception of these four
instances, an individual is able to make all of the decisions
concerning the disclosure of her protected health information.
The Act recognizes an individual's interest in her own personal
and medical information. It not only gives individuals control over
their own information, but it also provides them with remedies
when their rights are violated. The Act prescribes civil sanctions
for persons who have "materially failed to comply with the
provisions of the Act., 229 For persons who have knowingly
violated the Act, criminal sanctions and prison sentences have been

225. H.R. 1815, § 201(b)(2)(A)(1).
226. See id.
227. d
228. See id.
229. Id. § 301. The Act states that any person who has failed to comply with the
provisions of the Act shall be subject to "a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each
violation, but not to exceed $150,000 in the aggregate for multiple violations in any one
year." Id. However, if the violations occur with such frequency that they constitute a
general business practice, then the punishment would be a "civil penalty of not more than
$500,000" and exclusion from any applicable federal programs. Id.
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established.23 At the very least, the Act ensures that an infringement on an individual's rights will not go unnoticed and unpunished.
VII. Conclusion
In the twenty-one states that do not have mandatory disclosure
statutes, the question of duty still remains a question of law.
Looking for the answer in our current body of tort law has proved
to yield unsatisfactory results. Even though the duty element in a
negligence action is supposed to be "an expression of the sum total
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
plaintiff is entitled to protection,"'2 3 more times than not our
courts have held that no duty of disclosure is owed. Even when
confronted with the duty of disclosure that has been placed on
employers, the courts have still refused to impose this much needed
duty on insurance companies. Therefore, in order for insurance
applicants and policyholders to realize an interest in their own
medical information, the Medical Privacy in the Age of New
Technologies Act must be passed.
With the enactment of this legislation, individuals' lives and
privacy will be protected and preserved. As applicants and insurers
will be able to learn the results of their medical examinations, they
will no longer lose valuable treatment time and succumb to
preventable deaths. They will also be able to take precautionary
measures to help prevent the infection of others with whom they
come in contact. Ultimately, passage of insurance disclosure
legislation will force insurance companies to treat medical information as more than just a way to determine insurability.
Hannah E. Greenwald

230. H.R. 1815, § 311. if a person knowingly discloses or obtains protected health
information in violation of the Act, "such person shall be fined under Title 18, United States
Code, imprisoned not more than one year, or both." Id. However, if the offense is
committed under false pretenses, the prison sentence can be as long as five years. Id. If the
information is obtained with the "intent to sell, transfer, or use for commercial advantage,
personal gain, or malicious harm," the prison sentence can be as long as ten years. Id.
231. Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243, 251 (D. Md. 1993).

